Understanding perspectives on major system change: A comparative case study of public engagement and the implementation of urgent and emergency care system reconfiguration. by Foley, Conor et al.
Foley, C; Droog, E; Healy, O; McHugh, S; Buckley, C; Browne, JP
(2017) Understanding perspectives on major system change: A com-
parative case study of public engagement and the implementation of
urgent and emergency care system reconfiguration. Health policy
(Amsterdam, Netherlands), 121 (7). pp. 800-808. ISSN 0168-8510
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.05.009
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4645429/
DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.05.009
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/
Health Policy 121 (2017) 800–808
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Health  Policy
j our na l ho me pag e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /hea l thpol
Understanding  perspectives  on  major  system  change:  A  comparative
case  study  of  public  engagement  and  the  implementation  of  urgent
and  emergency  care  system  reconﬁguration
Conor  Foleya,∗, Elsa  Drooga, Orla  Healyb, Sheena  McHugha,  Claire  Buckleya,
John  Patrick  Brownea
a Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Western Road, University College Cork, Ireland
b South/South West Hospital Group, Ireland
a  r  t  i  c  l e  i  n  f  o
Article history:
Received 22 December 2016
Received in revised form 21 May  2017
Accepted 22 May  2017
Keywords:
Health services research
Delivery of healthcare
Qualitative research
Reconﬁguration
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Objectives:  Major  changes  have  been  made  to  how  emergency  care  services  are  conﬁgured  in  several
regions  in  the Republic  of  Ireland.  This  study  investigated  the hypothesis  that  engagement  activities
undertaken  prior  to these  changes  inﬂuenced  stakeholder  perspectives  on the  proposed  changes  and
impacted  on the  success  of  implementation.
Methods:  A  comparative  case-study  approach  was  used  to explore  the  changes  in  three  regions.  These
regions  were  chosen  for  the  case  study  as the  nature  of  the proposals  to reconﬁgure  care  provision  were
broadly  similar  but implementation  outcomes  varied  considerably.  Documentary  analysis  of  reconﬁg-
uration  planning  reports  was  used  to identify  planned  public  engagement  activities.  Semi-structured
interviews  with  74  purposively-sampled  stakeholders  explored  their  perspectives  on  reconﬁguration,
engagement  activities  and  public  responses  to reconﬁguration.  Framework  analysis  was  used,  integrating
inductive  and  deductive  approaches.
Results:  Approaches  to public  engagement  and  success  of implementation  differed  considerably  across
the  three  cases.  Regions  that presented  the  public  with  the reconﬁguration  plan  alone  reported  greater
public  opposition  and  difﬁculty  in  implementing  changes.  Engagement  activities  that  included  a  range  of
stakeholders  and  continued  throughout  the reconﬁguration  process  appeared  to  largely  address  public
concerns,  contributing  to smoother  implementation.
Conclusions:  The  presentation  of reconﬁguration  reports  alone  is  not  enough  to convince  communities  of
the case  for  change.  Genuine,  ongoing  and  inclusive  engagement  offers  the  best opportunity  to  address
community  concerns  about  reconﬁguration.
©  2017  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Healthcare systems have been described as ‘complex adaptive
systems’, consisting of the combination of organisations, resources
and management required to provide health services to a popu-
lation [1,2]. Such systems involve numerous actors operating at
various levels and are subject to continuous change and adaptation,
through formal and informal processes [3]. As the health needs of
populations have changed and medical technology has advanced,
health systems have faced pressure to adapt [4]. In the acute hos-
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pital sector, the policy response in many countries has focused on
reconﬁguration of services to a more centralised and specialised
model, particularly for complex care conditions [5,6].
Reconﬁguration may  be deﬁned as “a deliberately induced
change of some signiﬁcance in the distribution of medical, surgi-
cal, diagnostic and ancillary specialties that are available in each
hospital or other secondary or tertiary acute care unit in a locality,
region or health care administrative area” [4]. A synonymous term
‘major system change’ is also commonly used, deﬁned as “interven-
tions aimed at coordinated, system-wide change affecting multiple
organisations and care providers” [7,8].
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.05.009
0168-8510/© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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1.1. Arguments for reconﬁguration and opposing perspectives
Although reconﬁguration is often presented as an ‘evidence-
based’ approach to improving system efﬁciency and outcomes, a
number of studies have characterised it as an inherently political
and contentious process [5,9]. Proposals to reconﬁgure emergency
care services have been found to be particularly controversial, often
subject to strong community resistance [5]. Public opposition to
the reconﬁguration of emergency care has affected its implemen-
tation and revealed divergent priorities for healthcare provision
across different stakeholder groups [10,11]. Research evidence on
volume-outcome relationships has been employed to justify cen-
tralising care at large specialist hospitals [11]. However, this is
contested and it has been argued that centralisation can actually
hamper patient outcomes in certain circumstances and is detri-
mental to other aspects of the core mission of healthcare systems
such as access and experience [4,9]. Critics have further argued that
the centralisation approach is primarily motivated by a desire to
reduce costs [12,13].
Jones and Exworthy explored ‘framing’ in the communication of
arguments for changes to hospital services in the UK [14]. The pol-
icy of centralising hospital services was initially framed in terms
of improving access and experience. However, over time there
has been a shift towards portraying centralisation as a clinical
necessity to address risks to patient safety which outweighs other
concerns about access and experience. It is suggested that this was
aimed at overcoming community opposition to changes, as was
the co-opting of inﬂuential ﬁgures from the medical profession to
‘champion’ the changes.
1.2. Public engagement
The highly ‘pluralistic’ nature of public-sector healthcare bodies
has been described in the organisational literature. Such bod-
ies typically have multiple objectives, diffuse power structures
and knowledge-based work processes, and these characteristics
present a number of challenges to the implementation of strategic
change [15]. Implementation depends on numerous interrelated
contextual factors such as the nature of the change itself, relation-
ships between key local actors, the presence of key change leaders
and environmental pressures [16]. Denis and colleagues suggest
that bringing about change in pluralistic organisations requires
power, legitimacy and knowledge, as multiple interests must be
satisﬁed. Thus, attention must be paid to the requirements of actors
within and outside of the organisation in order to garner their sup-
port [15].
As a response to these pressures, formal engagement processes
have been developed to involve stakeholders such as staff, patients
and the public in planning around healthcare. Guidelines have also
been developed to advise policy-makers and managers on how best
to engage communities around reconﬁguration [17]. A three-stage
process has been employed in the UK, involving information-
sharing, public meetings and ﬁnal decision-making informed by
public feedback [5,17,18]. In Ireland, a recently-produced guidance
document has called for increased public participation in policy-
making in order to improve public understanding of how policy is
developed and enhance the ‘legitimacy’ of decision-making [19].
Within the Irish healthcare arena, there is a growing trend towards
formal public and patient involvement in designing new policies
and programmes [20].
Several authors have criticised current approaches to public
engagement in healthcare [18,21], highlighting the lack of consis-
tency in methods employed and poor measurement of their impact
[22]. Barratt and colleagues explored public responses to emer-
gency care reconﬁguration programmes carried out in the UK [18],
ﬁnding that the public felt their concerns were ignored despite the
extensive engagement process conducted. The authors challenged
the apparent belief among policy-makers that local communities
can be convinced of the need for change if presented with the ‘right’
evidence, and it is argued that more effort must be made to address
the range of community concerns around planned changes.
It has been suggested that the purpose of public engagement has
not generally been well-deﬁned, which has contributed to the lack
of evidence regarding its direct impact on the success or failure of
reconﬁguration [22]. Jones suggests that public engagement in its
current form is not a democratic and egalitarian sharing of views in
order to reach a consensus, but is instead inﬂuenced by a positivist,
rational and technocratic ideology which values abstract ‘expert’
knowledge over and above the experiential ‘non-expert’ knowl-
edge of the public and patients [23]. It is argued that clinicians have
been co-opted by policymakers to reinforce the framing of central-
isation as a clinical necessity. In essence then, public engagement
is characterised as providing a veneer of democratic involvement
in decisions that are in fact made based on the views of an elite
minority.
Terms such as ‘consultation’, ‘engagement’ and ‘involvement’
have been used interchangeably in the literature, with little con-
sistency in deﬁnitions and methods associated with each term.
In order to address this issue, the International Association for
Public Participation [24,25] has created a descriptive public partic-
ipation spectrum (Fig. 1) which outlines different levels of public
engagement in planning, and typical methods associated with each
category. Under this conceptualisation, public participation ranges
from merely being informed of plans, to empowerment in decision-
making. We  have adopted the deﬁnitions outlined in the spectrum
in our descriptions of public engagement activities.
The current study explores stakeholder perspectives on the pub-
lic engagement undertaken during the reconﬁguration of urgent
and emergency care systems in the Republic of Ireland. Specif-
ically, this study investigates the hypothesis that engagement
activities undertaken prior to urgent and emergency care service
reconﬁguration inﬂuence stakeholder perspectives, and impact on
implementation outcomes.
2. Methods
2.1. Setting
The Health Service Executive (HSE) is the public sector body
responsible for the delivery of health care in the Republic of Ireland.
It is responsible for the delivery of most urgent and emergency care
in Ireland through acute hospital emergency departments, acute
assessment units and minor injury units. A small number of pri-
vate urgent care facilities also operate in Dublin, Cork and Galway.
Public ambulance services are delivered by the National Ambulance
Service and Dublin Fire Brigade. Primary care is largely delivered by
private general practices. Privately-run out of hours primary care
is also available in most of the country. Urgent and emergency care
services are not universally free at the point of contact. Patients
who attend a public emergency department without referral from
primary care are liable for a charge (currently D 100) unless they
fall beneath an income threshold or into a set of clinical categories.
In 2006 the HSE introduced a programme designed to ‘trans-
form’ healthcare provision, with the overall aim of improving
system coordination, quality and efﬁciency [26]. One aspect of this
programme involved region-level reconﬁguration of acute hospital
services, including urgent and emergency care. The implementa-
tion of reconﬁguration has differed across Ireland; several regions
have made changes to the conﬁguration of services while others
have made few changes. The changes have largely consisted of
closing or downgrading the function of smaller emergency depart-
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Fig. 1. Spectrum of approaches to public participation, typical methods and their impact [24].
ments in rural parts of the country and centralising complex care
services to larger tertiary hospitals. Further information on urgent
and emergency care provision in Ireland is contained in a sup-
plementary ﬁle. A description of care provision in each of the
case-study regions is provided in Table 1.
2.2. Design
This study employed a comparative case study design. Compar-
ative case studies are particularly suitable for studies seeking to
understand and explain the inﬂuence of context on the success-
ful implementation of an intervention [27,28]. The current analysis
focuses on three regions: North East, Mid-West and South, where
large-scale reconﬁguration was planned and implemented by the
HSE. Region-speciﬁc reconﬁguration planning documents were
commissioned for each of these regions [29–32]. These regions
were chosen for the case study as the nature of the proposals to
reconﬁgure care provision were broadly similar but implemen-
tation outcomes varied considerably. The characteristics of these
regions and changes to the conﬁguration of services are described in
Table 1. In the North East and Mid-West, reconﬁguration of urgent
and emergency care services commenced in 2009, with the South
commencing in 2012.
2.2.1. Documentary analysis
Documentary analysis of reconﬁguration planning documents
for the three regions was conducted in order to examine the
planned public engagement processes. Published regional planning
documents were identiﬁed by a member of the study team working
within the health service. This team member was not involved in
collection or analysis of interview data.
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Table  1
Regional characteristics and summary of reconﬁguration undertaken.
Region (Constituent
counties)
Population Area
(km2)
Urban population a Pre-Reconﬁguration Care
Provision
Recommended Changes Implementation
North East
(Meath, Louth, Cavan,
Monaghan)
440,211 6395 0.51 Five acute hospitals
accepting undifferentiated
emergency patients.
No identiﬁed regional hub
hospital for specialist care.
Construction of new
regional hospital to
become hub for emergency
care. Existing emergency
departments to be
reconﬁgured to minor
injury units [29].
Partial Implementation.
New regional hospital not
constructed.
Two  emergency
departments reconﬁgured
to minor injury units. Some
centralisation of trauma,
coronary and stroke care.
Mid-West
(Clare,  Limerick, North
Tipperary)
378,210 8252 0.47 Four acute hospitals
accepting undifferentiated
emergency patients.
Regional hub hospital in
Limerick city providing
specialist care.
Transfer of all emergency
care to hub in Limerick.
Three existing emergency
departments to be
reconﬁgured to minor
injury units [30].
Full but delayed
implementation
South
(Cork, Kerry)
663,176 12,161 0.56 Six acute hospitals
accepting undifferentiated
emergency patients.
Regional hub hospital in
Cork city providing
specialist care.
Most emergency care to be
transferred to hub in Cork,
emergency department to
be retained in Kerry, two
existing emergency
departments to become
minor injury units, one ED
to close [31,32].
Full implementation
a Proportion of population living in urban area [34].
2.2.2. Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of
stakeholders to explore their perspectives on the public engage-
ments that took place and community responses to planned
changes. Participants were sampled using purposive and snowball
sampling methods [33]. An initial ‘core set’ of potential partici-
pants who were centrally involved in the reconﬁguration process
were identiﬁed by the research team. These participants were then
asked to suggest other individuals they believed could assist with
the study.
Stakeholders were categorised according to their role in rela-
tion to the health service. The term ‘internal stakeholders’ refers to
a heterogeneous group. It includes those directly working within
the regional HSE management structures and involved in recon-
ﬁguration planning and implementation. It also includes ‘internal
outsiders’ for example HSE clinicians whose views and interests
will not necessarily coincide with HSE management. The term
‘external stakeholders’ refers to those working outside the HSE and
also covers a heterogeneous group, including general practitioners,
politicians, hospital campaigners, journalists and others.
The interview topic guide explored stakeholder views on pub-
lic engagement and perspectives on the impact of reconﬁguration.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed by the study team.
2.2.3. Analysis
Framework analysis was used [35], employing an adapted ver-
sion of a framework developed by Spurgeon and colleagues [9].
The coding framework is available as a supplementary ﬁle. Ini-
tially, documentary and interview data were analysed separately
by independent researchers using NVivo software for data man-
agement. There were three major stages in the analysis process:
(1) Familiarisation with the data and identiﬁcation of key issues; (2)
Charting the relationship between issues/sub-issues and individual
interview charts; and (3) Summarising the content from individ-
ual interviews to map  to the relevant issue/sub-issue. To ensure
consistency in application of the coding framework, researchers
met  regularly to compare coding. Where inconsistencies occurred,
researchers consulted with a senior colleague in order to reach con-
Table 2
Number of stakeholders interviewed, by region and position.
Region
Position North East Mid-West South
Internal 8 13 21
Clinician 3 5 7
Management 3 5 10
Nursing 2 4 4
External 9 8 15
Ambulance personnel 0 2 3
General practitioner 3 2 4
Hospital campaigner 2 1 4
Media representative 1 1 2
Politician 3 2 2
Total 17 21 36
sensus and modiﬁcations to the coding framework were made if
necessary.
In line with the approach recommended by Yin, data for
each case were initially analysed separately [28]. Individual case
summaries were developed from documentary evidence and ini-
tial readings of interviews, describing the planned engagement
activities and stakeholder responses to reconﬁguration. This was
followed by a cross-case analysis using Yin’s ‘pattern matching’
approach [28].
3. Results
In total 74 stakeholders were recruited for interview across
the regions, and four regional reconﬁguration documents were
analysed. A breakdown of stakeholders by region and position is
provided in Table 2.
3.1. North East
The North East was  the ﬁrst region for which a reconﬁguration
plan was  produced [29]. The reconﬁguration planning document
emphasised several “disturbing aspects” of existing urgent and
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emergency care provision. Guidelines from Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and the UK were cited in recommending that a new-build
regional hospital providing emergency care would be most suitable
to provide safe, effective care for the population.
In relation to engagement, the report described visits to hospital
sites in the North East to meet with staff as part of the investiga-
tion into service provision in the region. However, there was  no
reference to planned engagement with the local community in the
report, with just a single mention of potential community interest
in the report’s content:
“The Health Service Executive has indicated to us that we should
anticipate subsequent wide circulation of this report to the gen-
eral public, patients, clinicians, staff, trade unions, local hospital
groups, professional, academic and regulatory bodies, local and
national politicians and governmental organisations, and pri-
vate sector organisations with interests in healthcare reﬂecting
widespread interest in improving healthcare in the North East”
[29]
During our interviews, regional stakeholders referred to some
public meetings that had taken place at a local level around changes
in provision at speciﬁc facilities. The purpose of these meetings was
apparently to share information with various groups.
“we did a whole communication plan. We  went out to the pub-
lic. We  had public consultation with politicians every month,
with any group that wanted to meet us, the Women’s Institute,
you name it, clerical groups, the bishop. We  met  everybody
when [NE hospital] was going off call.” Internal management
stakeholder.
This point was contradicted somewhat by two external stake-
holders. It was noted by a member of a protest group that health
service management had refused to meet with the group as they
had not been elected and thus had no “mandate” to represent the
people. A general practitioner also noted a lack of clarity regarding
planned changes, stating that “we just heard rumours”.
A management stakeholder involved in communication at
region-level noted a reluctance amongst planners to engage with
the public on service changes:
“I suppose we seem to shy away from that a little bit because
it’s the people who oppose these are generally the ones that are
going to turn up”. Internal HSE management stakeholder.
Stakeholders gave a mixed response to the changes, with some
in favour and others opposed to the changes. In general, internal
stakeholders appeared to endorse the reconﬁguration plan, though
some expressed reservations around how it was implemented and
explained to the public.
Hospital campaigners and general practitioners generally
rejected the case for change, questioning the evidence provided
and motivations behind the plan.
“They can’t show us the research for, the international best prac-
tice for removing all emergency services from a local hospital”
External stakeholder, hospital campaigner.
Protest groups were organised in three towns where emergency
facilities were to be replaced by minor injury units. Participants
described how large-scale protest marches and media cam-
paigns were separately launched by these groups, which received
widespread coverage in national and local media [36–38]. The
groups were organised around their ‘local’ hospital and did not coa-
lesce or coordinate their activities despite expressing very similar
views. Stakeholders representing these groups rejected the argu-
ment that centralising care at a single site would improve quality
and safety, instead emphasising the safety of care provision in their
local hospital, as well as its importance to their local community’s
sense of worth and security.
3.2. Mid-West
The Mid-West was the second region to implement reconﬁg-
uration of acute hospital services. The reconﬁguration planning
document for the region was produced by external management
consultants [30], and explicitly acknowledged the inﬂuence of the
approach taken to reconﬁguring services in the North East. The
report concluded that acute resources were “diluted” across hospi-
tal sites, with no site having sufﬁcient patient volumes or resources
to provide safe and sustainable care. It was  suggested that emer-
gency care be centralised to a single hospital in Limerick, the
region’s major population centre.
The Mid-West report included a chapter on implementing the
plan, which made speciﬁc reference to public engagement. It was
recommended that a “professional media awareness and informa-
tion programme” be developed in order to inform the public of the
planned changes and the reasoning behind them [30].
It was  evident from the stakeholder interviews that some
engagement had taken place at regional and local levels, though it
was apparently intended to inform relevant groups of the planned
changes rather than seek their opinions. An internal stakeholder
involved in implementing the regional plan noted that meetings
with GPs in the region were particularly ill-tempered, describ-
ing them as “very aggressive”. GP stakeholders expressed concern
at the loss of access to services at several hospitals and indi-
cated dissatisfaction with their interactions with reconﬁguration
planners.
“There wasn’t consultation, it was decided that ‘we’re doing this
and that’s it’ and the level of consultation, that’s a very impor-
tant thing. Consultation means ‘evacuate your bases in Crimea,
we’re moving in’, that’s consultation from the HSE” External
stakeholder, GP.
A management stakeholder based at a hospital due to lose its
accident and emergency department noted that they had avoided
engaging with the public due to the expected negative response.
“we probably didn’t include our public in consultation around
what we were doing because we wouldn’t have got agreement
anyway” internal stakeholder, management
As in the North East, public reaction to the planned changes
was generally quite negative. Protest campaigns were organised
around two  hospitals in the towns of Ennis and Nenagh, both of
which were due to have their emergency departments reconﬁg-
ured to minor injury units [39]. Stakeholders representing these
groups opposed the idea of centralising emergency services to Lim-
erick on the grounds that patients would have to travel longer
distances, and perceived lack of capacity at Limerick to deal with
the inﬂux of new patients. It was  suggested that the changes were
instead motivated by ill-conceived cost-saving and centralisation
agendas.
“The admin people inherently believe that bigger is cheaper.
They think you get what’s called economies of scale but it’s not
true. You might if you’re doing endoscopies get economies . . .
but not if you get a cardiac arrest.” Internal stakeholder, hospital
clinician.”
Implementing reconﬁguration proved a difﬁcult and lengthy
process, with long delays in transferring emergency services from
Ennis and Nenagh.
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“That got pushed back, that didn’t actually happen until 2012,
it was meant to happen in 2010.” Internal stakeholder, hospital
clinician.
Several stakeholders attributed these delays to political inter-
ference and opposition, including amongst hospital staff.
“There was ﬁerce protests against it so therefore it was  delayed.”
External stakeholder, hospital campaigner.
“To some degree we got resistance from staff as well.” Internal
stakeholder, management.
3.3. South
External management consultants were commissioned to
review acute services in the region [31], producing recommenda-
tions that were consistent with those in the Mid-West and North
East. It was recommended that emergency care be centralised to
a single hospital site in Cork city. Subsequently, health service
management for the South produced a ‘Reconﬁguration Roadmap’
document for the region, described as “the HSE’s response” to the
original review [32]. The recommendations of the ‘Roadmap’ doc-
ument differ somewhat to those of the management consultants,
calling for the retention of an emergency department at Kerry Gen-
eral Hospital and deﬁning a clear role for all acute hospitals in the
region.
The ‘Roadmap’ document provided a signiﬁcant level of detail
on engagement, including a section outlining the communication
strategy for addressing the public. Public events were to be held to
explain and showcase service changes, with advanced paramedics
meeting community groups in areas where emergency depart-
ments were to close. The report also named stakeholders from a
broad range of backgrounds including public representatives, busi-
ness people and general practitioners who were formally consulted
with during the reconﬁguration planning process.
It was evident from the stakeholder interviews that extensive
public engagement had taken place around reconﬁguration. An
internal stakeholder involved in the reconﬁguration programme
suggested that the public meetings, press releases and media
campaigns helped to inform the public and assuage fears and mis-
understandings around the changes.
“10,000 people won’t march on the streets unless they believe
there’s something fundamentally wrong, and if you are doing
the right thing and they are still marching there only two  things,
only two things that would explain that. One is you’re doing the
wrong thing, or you’re not spending enough time explaining to
them. If you spend enough time explaining to them and you are
doing the right thing they won’t march. You’ve got to give time
to those issues” Internal clinical stakeholder
Several stakeholders expressed doubts about the plan, with
stakeholders representing community protest groups highlighting
a loss of access to local services, lengthened travel distances and
ambulance response times. It was evident that there was extensive
formal and informal interaction between community groups and
the reconﬁguration implementation team, even after implementa-
tion had taken place.
“We’re meeting with [HSE representative] on a very regular
basis now and we’re bringing up questions for him” External
stakeholders, hospital campaigner
Despite this, one stakeholder felt that the public did not fully
appreciate the implications of the planned changes.
“local people had little inﬂuence and many still do not fully
understand the changes” External stakeholder, hospital cam-
paigner.
As in the other regions, some stakeholders felt that the engage-
ment was merely a box-ticking exercise, with little chance of
making meaningful changes to the plan.
“I always got the impression that it was  a fait accompli anyway,
that it was  never [going to change the plan]” External stake-
holder, media.
Nevertheless, stakeholders in the South generally appeared
to be comparatively accepting of the reconﬁguration, and public
opposition was less vociferous than in other regions.
3.4. Cross-case analysis
Implementation of planned reconﬁguration differed consider-
ably across regions, both in the ﬁdelity to the original plan and the
methods of public engagement employed. Public opposition was
notable in each case but tended to be localised in character. Findings
are summarised in Table 3. It was apparent from the documentary
analysis that reconﬁguration of services was  justiﬁed on the basis
of quality and safety concerns, along with a drive towards creating
what was described as a more efﬁcient and effective model of care
[29–32].
3.4.1. Nature of public engagement carried out
With the exception of the South region, planning documents
provided little detail on public engagement. The available evidence
suggests an ad-hoc approach to public engagement was  taken, with
little consistency across regions. However, there was some evi-
dence that regions learned from the experience of those who had
begun the reconﬁguration process before them. For example, while
engagement in the North East was  largely localised, it was apparent
that in the Mid-West a mix  of region-level and local engagements
had taken place. In the South, engagement activities were more
extensive again, with representatives from various backgrounds
and areas invited to join planning and implementation groups.
In general, engagement was  focused on the implementation of
plans, however in the South there was evidence that stakehold-
ers outside of the health service had a role in planning the changes
prior to their implementation. The purpose of conducting public
engagement was not clearly articulated in either documentary or
interview sources.
3.4.2. Stakeholder positions and perspectives
Stakeholder perspectives on the case for reconﬁguration were
largely related to their position in the health service. Internal stake-
holders typically endorsed the promised efﬁciency and safety gains,
though there were some exceptions in this cohort. External stake-
holders expressed a range of perspectives. GP stakeholders ranged
from giving guarded support for planned changes to outright rejec-
tion and campaigning against them.
The position of politicians appeared to heavily depend on
whether their party was in power or not. Stakeholders afﬁliated
with government parties tended to support reconﬁguration, while
those afﬁliated with opposition parties generally rejected reconﬁg-
uration and were in many cases involved in campaigning against
it.
For some stakeholders the engagement process appeared to
harden positions they had already adopted. For example, GP stake-
holders in the Mid-West reported that they grew increasingly
convinced that reconﬁguration was being pushed through to save
money, based on the perceived one-sided engagements they had
with regional health service management. It was  also notable
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Table 3
Summary of reconﬁguration planning and public engagement undertaken in each region.
North East Mid-West South
Reconﬁguration planning External management consultants met
with national-level senior
management and clinicians before
producing report. No evidence of
public involvement.
External management consultants
overseen by project steering group,
composed of regional and national
level clinicians and managers. No
evidence of public involvement
Regional group set up to respond to
management consultant report.
Representatives from across health
service, as well as business, public and
patient representatives involved.
Leadership Plan apparently directed from central
HSE in Dublin, no local clinical
leadership.
Implementation team led by local
clinician included academic
representatives, clinicians, nurses and
management representatives.
Implementation team led by local
clinician. Report outlines deﬁned roles
and time commitments for named
individuals.
Planned public engagement Report acknowledges expected public
interest in plans but no engagement
plan is outlined.
“Media awareness and information
programme” called for to inform staff
and public of beneﬁts of planned
changes.
Public events planned to showcase
enhanced ambulance provision.
Detailed public engagement plan
included in planning document.
Engagement methods Staff brieﬁngs, newsletters, media
campaigns and internet
announcements used. Local-level
engagement around changes at speciﬁc
hospitals.
Region-wide public meetings held
with GPs. Local-level engagement
around changes at speciﬁc hospitals.
Limited formal public engagement
beyond media awareness campaigns.
Public presentations, newsletters,
road-shows and web tools used to
engage with public and other
stakeholders at regional and local
levels.
Response to changes Protest groups organised around
hospitals due to ‘lose’ ED. Mixed buy-in
to  reconﬁguration among clinicians
and GPs, and some were active in
protest groups. Some high-proﬁle
politicians involved in opposing
changes in the region.
Protest groups organised around
hospitals due to ‘lose’ ED. GPs generally
opposed plan, some hospital
consultants publicly withdrew support
for reconﬁguration. Some clinicians
were active in protest groups, as were
a number of high-proﬁle politicians.
Protest groups organised around
hospitals due to ‘lose’ ED. Several GPs
and politicians offered guarded
support for reconﬁguration and were
not involved in protests.
that public opposition to changes did not appear to change the
perspectives of those already in favour of reconﬁguration. Sev-
eral internal stakeholders involved in planning and implementing
reconﬁguration attributed opposition to public misunderstand-
ing, or unwillingness to understand the arguments advocating the
changes in service provision.
3.4.3. Engagement, opposition and implementation
Organised opposition to reconﬁguration was evident in each
region but engagement activities appeared to have some inﬂu-
ence on the magnitude of opposition. In the South for example,
the ongoing nature of engagement between regional management
and stakeholders appeared to mollify dissent to a greater degree
than was observed in other regions. This appeared to facilitate the
implementation process, as reconﬁguration in other regions was
delayed by vociferous community opposition.
Campaign groups opposed to reconﬁguration typically argued
that reconﬁguration would result in increased risks for populations
due to longer distances of travel to receive emergency care, par-
ticularly for rural populations. It was also generally suggested by
representatives of these groups that the government and Health
Service Executive valued saving money over the health and safety
of the population. Despite common concerns, campaign groups
tended to remain localised, and efforts to develop a national protest
movement did not come to fruition. The politicised nature of protest
campaign groups may  have hampered their cooperation, and sev-
eral stakeholders noted rivalries between groups with different
party afﬁliations.
4. Discussion
This study investigated the hypothesis that public engagement
activities inﬂuence perspectives on reconﬁguration and implemen-
tation outcomes. The case studies we present offer support for
the assertion that public engagement can inﬂuence perspectives
and responses to reconﬁguration. Public engagement led to small
changes to the implementation of reconﬁguration plans in the
South region but there was little evidence of impact in the other
two regions studied.
It is apparent that public participation in decision-making
around reconﬁguration was  generally quite limited. However, the
South region engaged in a more inclusive engagement process
than other regions, with a broad range of stakeholders apparently
involved in designing the ﬁnal reconﬁguration plan. In addition,
there was  an open channel of communication between commu-
nity groups opposed to the changes and those managing the change
process throughout its duration. While protests did take place in
the South, there did not appear to be the same degree of ani-
mosity towards reconﬁguration as encountered in the other two
regions, and several stakeholders attributed this to the extensive
and interactive engagement undertaken. By contrast, in the North
East and Mid-West, where engagement was  typically characterised
as little more than information-sharing, opposition among the pub-
lic and other external stakeholders was  a notable feature. Despite
the shared concerns of communities across the country, organised
opposition to reconﬁguration remained localised, thwarting sev-
eral attempts to form a national coalition. It was  apparent that
groups afﬁliated with rival political parties (or groups that were
expressly apolitical) tended to view each other with suspicion.
Previous studies on community resistance to reconﬁguration
have emphasised the importance of hospitals to local identity and
the sense of ownership that communities have over these facili-
ties. The local political context, the actors involved and the tactics
employed have also been identiﬁed as having an inﬂuence on com-
munity resistance [40]. Researchers have drawn on theoretical
frameworks from sociology and political science to explain the gap
between expert and public perspectives [41,42]. This disparity has
been attributed to fundamental differences in how the public and
‘experts’ process and perceive information about risks, described as
the ‘expert-lay divide’ [41]. Recent research has demonstrated that
merely presenting communities with evidence to justify planned
changes is not enough to persuade them to support reconﬁguration
[4,18] and may  in fact contribute to public opposition by reinforc-
ing the notion that ‘expert’ opinion is more valuable than the views
of the public [18]. Arnstein has argued that information-sharing
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approaches may  be viewed as tokenistic or manipulative by the
public, serving only to demonstrate the power imbalance between
decision-makers and citizens [43]
While it is unlikely that a ‘perfect’ engagement strategy exists,
Dalton and colleagues identiﬁed several factors associated with
positive public engagement [22]. The best outcomes were found in
cases where the engagement process started at the early stages of
planning, the public were offered opportunities for genuine inter-
action, the process was led by clinicians involved in delivering
the service in question, and public representatives were engaged
with. The approach taken in the South generally aligned with these
recommendations, and it was clear that opposition to reconﬁgu-
ration was low in comparison to the other regions. However, care
must be taken to avoid conﬂating negligible protest with support
for changes, as protests may  be inﬂuenced by a variety of factors
beyond engagement activities including the nature of the planned
changes and local context [21]. There is also a potential danger of
developing an engagement process that is designed to overcome
opposition rather than to actually integrate the public into the
decision-making process.
In Ireland, guidelines for public consultation on decision-
making have portrayed public involvement as complementing the
democratic process, allowing the public to understand the process
and adding legitimacy to decisions [19,44]. Reference has previ-
ously been made to involving the public as healthcare ‘service users’
or ‘consumers’ whose input is required to improve their experi-
ence with the system [45,46]. It is thus apparent that the approach
in Ireland reﬂects international moves towards greater public and
patient involvement in decision-making around healthcare. Gibson
and colleagues offered a critique of approaches to this involvement
in the United Kingdom, suggesting that the government and other
state apparatus retain a deep mistrust of the public which under-
mines their power to inﬂuence decision-making in a meaningful
way [47].
In a demonstration of the ongoing and international nature of
problems with public engagement, a recent King’s Fund review
highlighted a lack of public and patient involvement in developing
NHS sustainability and transformation plans [48]. This is despite the
establishment of public engagement guidelines in the UK and the
potentially considerable changes in healthcare conﬁguration that
these plans will bring about. It is evident that there is a considerable
gulf between the ofﬁcial rhetoric around public and patient involve-
ment in decision-making and the reality on the ground. There is a
need to further explore how, and to what extent, the public wish
to be involved in decision-making in order to move beyond cur-
rent approaches which largely appear to be conducted on terms
developed to meet the requirements of policymakers. Through the
development of a shared understanding of what public and patient
involvement actually means, it should be possible to narrow the
‘lay-expert divide’ in decision-making.
The study was limited by its retrospective nature and varia-
tion in the number of stakeholders interviewed in each region,
with more in the South than other regions. This may  be partially
attributed to the fact that reconﬁguration was implemented later
in this region and a larger sample frame was available and will-
ing to participate. Nevertheless, the diverse range of stakeholders
interviewed in each region, as well as the availability of planning
documents helped create a rich picture of the engagement activities
that took place, and the various narratives that developed around
reconﬁguration. The categorisation of stakeholders as ‘internal’ and
‘external’ presented some issues as neither set was monolithic in
endorsing or opposing reconﬁguration. This was evidenced by the
fact that a number of internal stakeholders including clinicians and
nurses did not agree with the case for reconﬁguration, while man-
agement stakeholders unanimously endorsed the case for change.
It is also important to note that the three case-study regions actu-
ally implemented reconﬁguration to some degree. The majority of
regions in Ireland have seen little or no change of the type imple-
mented in the three study regions, despite sharing many of the
same characteristics and issues. Finally, other issues beyond the
scope of the current study may  have had an impact on implemen-
tation, for example the funding available to implement changes.
5. Conclusion
This study supports the assertion that the presentation of
‘expert’ evidence alone is not enough to convince communities
of the beneﬁts of reconﬁguration, ﬁnding instead that the public
are not passive consumers of what is ‘right’ but instead actively
question and oppose plans to change healthcare services in their
area. The need to develop effective public engagement strategies
is particularly pressing in the ‘post-truth’ world, where authority
and expertise are coming under increasing public scrutiny [49].
Our ﬁndings accord with previous research in suggesting that
engagement which is led by local clinicians, includes a range of
stakeholders from an early stage, and offers genuine and ongoing
public interaction, is most likely to be effective.
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